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Can "Radical" Simulation Theories Explain 
Psychological Concept Acquisition? 
 
 
Joëlle PROUST  
CREA, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris 
 
 
The question of understanding the behaviour of other 
agents in a psychological or mental way divides into two sub-
questions: 
(1) How can a human child above 3 and a half or an 
adult attribute certain kinds of psychological states rather 
than others to people, i.e. a state of belief, rather than of 
desire, hope, fear, etc?  
(2) How can such an interpreter find out correctly what 
is the content of the others' psychological states, i.e. a belief 
that P, a desire that Q, etc? 
Both theory-theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST) aim 
at answering these questions, but each actually only offers 
one part of the explanation. TT explains the capacity of using 
psychological concepts as a result of an innate, specialised 
module or as a result of a general process of theory building. 
But id does not explain how psychological concepts may 
adequately be applied to specific contents.1 ST explains how 
an interpreter can grasp the specific content of the other's 
                                                 
1 See Heal (1995), 37, (1996), 75. 
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psychological state, while leaving in the dark how a simulator 
can understanding the various psychological attitudes that 
other subjects entertain towards that content.  
In this paper, I will concentrate on the response offered 
to the latter problem by Robert Gordon, who espouses a 
simulationist view on how understanding others is achieved. 
This author indeed pushes to its limits the possibilities of 
radical simulationism, i.e. the view that mentalisation is a 
process requiring initially no possession of psychological 
concepts. It is interesting to see exactly what this theory can 
accomplish, and if it finally fails to explain mentalisation, 
why it does. 
 
 
Radical simulationism : main claims 
 
The basic claims of radical simulationism will be better 
articulated against the background of a weaker version of ST, 
such as the one defended by Alvin Goldman (Goldman, 
1989, 1992, 2001). According to Goldman, simulating 
another agent consists in taking her point of view on the 
world, and in producing "offline" the various responses 
(decisions, emotional states) that one would produce in such 
a situation if it was actually present. The basic feature of 
simulation, considered as a representational process, is that it 
is isomorphic to the target-process, which it is meant to 
mimic (Goldman, 1992, 108). 
According to Goldman, simulation is thus a three-step 
process. 1) Projecting into someone else's situation. 2) 
Appreciating introspectively what it is like to be in that 
situation. 3) Applying whatever psychological concepts 
available to categorise the feelings, desires and beliefs and 
other evaluations made in the second step, and attribute them 
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to the simulatee. Simulating, in such a theory, requires a prior 
expertise in mental state attribution. You must be able to 
recognise, say, a specific emotion or a belief in yourself to be 
able to ascribe it to another person. You must have 
categorised your own psychological states to recognize them 
as applying to other agents. 
Robert Gordon diverges from Alvin Goldman's view on 
simulation on three major counts. 
 
1) The first point of divergence has to do with the kind 
of projection needed to simulate others.Is the target of a 
projection a mind, a situation, an idiom? It will be useful here 
to contrast Gordon's view on projection with Quine's and 
Goldman's. Projecting oneself, in Quine's approach, implies 
that the simulator should imagine what it is like to be in 
another's state of mind. By this Quine understands that the 
simulator reconstruct the system of sentences held true by the 
simulatee. This process consists in translating the other's 
idiom into the simulator's, and in deriving the sentences that 
hold in the idiom modified in the appropriate way, according 
to a rationality principle: 
 
We project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other 
indications, we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been, 
and then we say what, in our language, is natural and relevant for us 
in the state thus feigned (Quine, 1960, 92). 
 
Alvin Goldman would agree that projection has to do 
with imagining being in another's state of mind, but he would 
deny that projecting always involves an exercise in 
translation. He explicitly allows simulation to account for 
non-propositional mental states like pains and itches (1995, 
84). Goldman maintains that simulating requires 
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introspecting what oneself would feel and believe if one was 
in such a situation, and ascribing similar contents to the 
simulatee.  
Robert Gordon does not see projection as allowing any 
kind of introspection, nor would he indeed accept without 
qualification the view that in simulation, an agent generally 
projects into somebody else's state of mind. On the other 
hand, Gordon does not take Quine's view on projection as a 
translation from an idiom to another. Projecting consists 
rather in recentering oneself into another's location and 
concerns through what Gordon calls an "egocentric shift". A 
"personal transformation" into the simulatee occurs, rather 
than a transfer into somebody else's mental states (Gordon, 
1995, 56). Simulation occurs through an imaginative 
transformation into the other, which allows the simulator to 
see the situation that the simulatee faces as she faces it. One 
might here object that it is not quite clear how such a shift 
may occur if not through some mental transfer. A plausible 
reconstruction might be the following. A simulator projects 
herself into a situation-type, i.e. in the situation that typically 
causes the mental state of the simulatee and makes it the type 
of mental state it is, rather than into the mental state itself 
(although projecting into a situation-type leads de facto to 
having some consonant set of beliefs and desires).  
 
2) The second major point of divergence has to do with 
mastery of psychological concepts being or not a prerequisite 
for simulating others, and more generally, with the 
relationship between simulating and believing. In Alvin 
Goldman's view, a simulator needs to be able to identify 
conceptually the kind of the mental state that she introspects 
in the pretend mode, in order to assign it to the simulated 
person. Simulating presupposes further an ability to frame the 
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proper kind of situation to be simulated, an ability that 
involves a considerable amount of knowledge of what others 
might believe and want about the situation.  
Gordon recognises that simulating situations different 
from one's own sometimes require a mastery of 
psychological concepts. He maintains however that there is a 
large class of simple cases in which no such mastery is 
required because no motivational or epistemic adjustment 
need to be done; furthermore, the capacity to simulate in 
those simpler cases might explain how psychological 
concepts are finally acquired. Early forms of simulation thus 
seem to him to require no mastery of psychological concepts, 
but rather, combined with "ascent routines", to allow a first 
crude way of categorising intentional states. The core idea of 
an ascent routine is the following. Phrases such as "I 
believe", "I want", etc. are first uttered purely expressively, in 
the absence of psychological concept possession: beliefs, 
wants, desires are expressed through a linguistic form 
borrowed from ordinary adult conversation, without the child 
having any particular concept of what the corresponding 
propositional attitude is. 
Ascent routine was first described by Gareth Evans, in 
his Varieties of Reference, (1982) in a chapter devoted to 
self-identification. "In making a self-ascription of belief, he 
writes, one's eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally 
directed outward - upon the world" (p. 225). To know 
whether I believe P, "I have to put into operation whatever 
procedure I have for answering the question whether P". 
There is a semantic ascent in this process, because from P, 
i.e. a fact which I take as holding in the world, I can derive a 
fact about myself, which I assert through the words " I 
believe that P". 
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Now as both Gareth Evans and Robert Gordon insist, 
using this procedure does not amount to a "full understanding 
of the content of the judgement "I believe that P". For Evans, 
a subject who performs the ascent routine may still lack the 
mastery of the generality condition, which applies to 
psychological concepts such as "x believes that P". In other 
words, she may fail to understand that the content she 
believes, namely P, can also be believed by other people. She 
may also be unable to grasp the fact that a belief is a claim 
for truth, which can be supported or not by the right kind of 
evidence. What the ascent routine does achieve, is a way of 
bypassing the notion that information about the self has an 
inner source, to be accessed through introspection (Evans, 
1982, 230). 
For ascent routine to work in the case of primitive 
simulations, one needs only accept that a subject who is able 
to "label" a belief or a desire in a real situation is also able to 
label those attitudes in pretence. Robert Gordon 
acknowledges that this early kind of simulation does not 
deliver a genuine, comprehending ascription of mental states, 
but he nevertheless claims that such simulatory practice may 
foster "greater conceptual understanding" (1996, 17). He 
suggests further that a process of embedding ascent routines 
in simulations "gives sense to the idea of a mental location". 
When simulating Peter, John projects himself in Peter's 
situation, and evaluates it from Peter's point of view. 
Projection amounts to a process of accepting propositions 
believed by Peter given a situation S. John thus gets a notion 
of "something's being a fact to Peter". Projection is normally 
followed by a deduction of those consequences of the 
accepted propositions relevant to Peter in S, and by an 
ascription to Peter of a belief in the propositions thus derived. 
By embedding ascent routines in simulation, Gordon means 
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to refer to the iteration of the question "is it a fact that P?" in 
various perspectival situations. The simulator is able to store 
the various responses to the same question using various 
individual-based situations: is it a fact that P for Peter? Is it a 
fact that P for Mary? Etc. What John finally learns is that 
some facts are acknowledged by most individuals, some 
others by few. What he will be unable to learn in this way, 
Gordon notices, is that there are facts without a mental 
location, i.e. facts considered by nobody, and about which the 
question of truth or falsity as a matter of fact does not arise.2 
 
3) Reliability — The question that is raised by the role of 
practical simulation in mentalisation is of what makes self- 
and other- ascription of beliefs and desires generally reliable. 
A process is reliable if it tends to produce true beliefs. As 
Gordon observes (Gordon, 1993, 45), reliability in self-
ascription of mental states may be taken to stem from a 
decision procedure - provided by appropriate concept 
application in theory-theory, and by introspection and 
categorisation in Goldman's approach. Gordon favours a 
view in which reliability does not rely on a decision 
procedure, but rather on a non-inferential, non-conceptual 
process: verbal labelling as described in the ascent routine 
provides reliability of self-ascription without any concept 
being actually called for. In his words, "reliability does not 
need theoretical knowledge". 
 
                                                 
2 This may be a problem for a full grasp of the concept of belief, but it 
may not be an objection to a theory of folk psychological concepts. It 
seems plausible that people tend to deny spontaneously that a proposition 




Objections to radical simulation theory 
 
A first well-known problem with the view that a 
simulator only needs to use the information contained in 
some perspectival situation is that some mastery of epistemic 
notions must be present for a subject to select, during 
deduction, those premises that are accepted by the simulatee. 
In other words, the notion of a situation relevant for belief 
ascription cannot be defined in purely extensional or subject-
neutral terms. A simulator must have some notion of which 
premises will be used in a simulated piece of practical 
reasoning. For example, if we take the tube test,3 which end 
will Peter choose? The unconnected opening just under the 
spot where a ball is launched, or the farther but connected 
opening? To predict adequately where Peter believes that the 
ball will go, I must include in my premises the proposition 
that Peter accepts the view that the ball has a causally 
restricted dynamics. If Peter accepts instead that a shorter 
distance between launching and picking up is a relevant 
element in the problem, my deduction will take another 
course. It is hard to see how such an appreciation of what 
premises are relevant can be effected without presupposing 
the very notion to be explained, i.e. the notion that a subject 
believes those propositions which he accepts and acts upon. 
 
A second difficulty concerns the view on psychological 
concept acquisition taken to result from a diversified 
simulatory practice. Gordon takes "embedding" of 
simulations to consist in a rather straightforward inquiry of 
whether the fact P is holding from the various perspectives of 
                                                 
3 See Hood (1995). 
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individual thinkers. The simple structure of "embedding" 
which Gordon uses, however, falls short of providing notion 
rich enough to prepare the understanding of a mental 
location. In his view, decentering one's perspective on a 
situation only requires changing places, in the literal sense of 
varying the spatial distance and perceptual access to objects, 
and keeping track of the various views on enduring objects 
and states of affairs. Spatial memory allows storing various 
points of view on one and the same situation, along with the 
specific properties associated with each one of them. Given 
an observer endowed with objectivity (i.e. capable of 
grasping the fact that perceived objects are stable individuals 
existing even when they are not perceived), a subject is in 
this analysis able to grasp perspectivalness. When I was 
there, the object looked round. Now I am here, and the object 
looks oval. 
Let us grant that simulating a situation does not involve 
taking the point of view of any specific subject, but only 
presuppose access to the informational content which one 
gets from occupying various possible locations. It may seem 
that a simple spatial variation between what is seen from 
here, from there, etc., offers the required contrast between 
situational properties, and prepares the acquisition of the 
concept of belief.  
But this seeming is illusory. It is a product of the silent 
use of psychological concepts in the description of spatial 
changes. The verb "seeing" carries the burden of conveying a 
psychological information on top of the information collected 
about the scene. More strictly described, spatial change 
appears no longer as sufficient to provide the sense of a 
mental location. Clearly, as Strawson (1959) showed, 
changing one's view on the world constitutes a necessary 
condition for representing stable entities that may exist 
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unperceived. But Gordon's claim is that perspectival 
simulation is a sufficient condition for understanding mental 
perspective. Data from primatology support rather the idea 
that there is a cognitive gap between understanding 
perspective and understanding belief.4 Non-human animals 
are quite good at predicting, in a simulatory way, which rival 
is likely to grasp some food, or to reach some prey, without 
having the least disposition to attribute to others the notion of 
"P being a fact for X" (or X believing P). Chimpanzees, for 
example, are certainly acting as if they had such a notion. But 
careful experimental work by primatologists (Povinelli, 
1996) shows that it is not the case. Although they can use 
some psychological information in the sense that they can 
follow the gaze of conspecifics, and use that information to 
detect for themselves what there is to be seen, they are unable 
to understand that the other acquired some perceptual 
knowledge. Non human primates are unable to tell apart an 
informed partner from a naive one; they cannot infer directly 
knowing from seeing. Although they may learn how to hide 
some behavioural signs of their inner states, they seem to do 
so on the basis of associations between behavioural cues. 
Not: "If I shout, he will know". But:" If I shout, he will bite". 
Autistic children seem also to have trouble to infer from a 
perceiving subject that this subject knows perceptually 
something (Baron-Cohen & Goodheart, 1994). On the other 
hand, they have no trouble finding out what will be on the 
picture, when the objects in front of the camera are being 
changed, a task which plausibly involves simulating prior 
perspectives (Zaitchik, 1990, Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). 
Mastery of perspectival information does not amount to 
mastery of epistemic perspective. 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion, see Proust (2001a). 
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 These findings tend to show that extracting 
psychological information - simulation being one way of 
doing so - may guide behaviour without allowing the agent to 
understand that the information used is indeed mental. For all 
the animal knows, so to speak, the information used is 
behavioural. It has to do with the types of things others can 
do in a particular situation, not with what the types of things 
they can believe and want to do. Therefore changing 
perspective through simulation does not offer per se any clue 
about psychological capacity. 
 
Let us come finally to Gordon's view on reliability. The 
notion of reliability that Gordon has in mind does not amount 
to a capacity of providing rational grounds for what one says 
or does. It has to do with the fact that the agent, while being 
or simulating being in a situation, will normally identify the 
right content of his/her belief or desire. After some linguistic 
training, children are able to utter "I want a banana" when 
and only when they want a banana. Doing so does not 
amount to a "genuine self-ascription of desire", Gordon 
acknowledges, because they may still lack a concept of desire 
(as well as a concept of themselves). This analysis illustrates 
the fact, stated above, that simulation theory is better 
equipped for explaining how particular psychological 
contents can be understood than for categorising the attitude 
which the simulated subject has towards that content. True, a 
child manages to convey that she wants a banana, rather than 
an orange; doing so, she does not need to know that there is 
something she wants, rather than hopes, regrets, believes, etc. 
But this simply reflects a fact about training; a trained animal 
reliably does what it was trained for doing. Why should this 
tell us anything about psychological concept acquisition? 
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 Therefore the reliability of the mechanism for uttering 
sentences that reflect mental states (but actually do not refer 
to them) should be contrasted with the reliability of a 
mechanism for self-attributing mental contents. Younger 
children may communicate what they want reliably, while 
utterly lacking a capacity for self-ascribing correctly 
psychological state types. Is the first kind of reliability a step 
towards acquiring a reliable mechanism of the second type? 
We shall struggle with this problem at the end of the chapter. 
 
 
Simulation reconsidered  
 
Gordon's radical simulationism stems from three 
important intuitions. The first is that simulation may be 
performed in a context-driven and agent-neutral way. The 
second is that simulation is a very basic, multi-purpose 
psychological process, that does not necessarily involve 
psychological concepts. The third is that simulation is 
harnessed to a practical reasoning system. From these three 
basic intuitions, the challenge consists in showing that 
simulation may indeed lead to psychological concept 
acquisition, or at least may provide an essential element in 
mentalisation. 
 
A) Simulation as a context-driven process 
Any kind of action involves representing a context, or a 
situation, in which the corresponding type of action normally 
develops. When an agent aims at producing a certain result 
by acting in a certain way, he/she has to represent what can 
be called "the canonical context" for that action. Such a 
canonical context includes a certain type of movement or 
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active involvement, as well as the relevant objects and 
properties (or the most salient) for reaching the given goal. If 
an agent's goal is to get food, for example, she will have to 
represent the canonical context most appropriate for that 
goal, which involves both perceptual cues and propositional 
knowledge (including concepts and inferential relations 
between them): is this cake on the kitchen table available? Is 
it fully cooked? Should I go instead to the bakery? Etc. 
Memories of prior successful actions determine what 
constituents will be included in a given canonical context. A 
context may be represented, in a few cases, in an essentially 
non-conceptual way (for example, when it comes to a 
particular step to be executed in dancing with a given rhythm 
and tempo). It may also, in other cases, involve mostly 
conceptual knowledge (such as, for example, the kind of 
events to expect when taking an exam).  
Most contexts involve both kinds of contents, conceptual 
as well as non-conceptual. Such an "action space"5 organised 
in the perspective of an acting subject is the fundamental 
representational structure activated and exploited in 
simulation. As simulation theorists have insisted, a capacity 
to simulate necessarily depends on the experience acquired 
by a subject: a given representation of a context includes 
elements that may not play a role in practical reasoning, or 
may be supplemented, replaced by other items, etc. When 
planning an action, an agent will need to simulate various 
contexts for reaching her goal, and various courses of action 
within one context. In the simulative phase, the agent needs 
to articulate specific perceptual expectations with conceptual-
instrumental reasoning. A young child may at first have 
trouble identifying the essential ingredients constituting a 
                                                 
5 Trevarthen (1999). 
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specific canonical context. Observing repeatedly the actions 
of other agents, listening to stories, engaging in pretend play, 
are the various means which help a child engage actively in 
context-typical simulations in ways that are more and more 
specific and appropriate. 
Empirical evidence tends to show that human agents 
represent actions, motor sequences and instrumental relations 
between means and goals (i.e. canonical contexts) in a way 
that is "agent-focussed" and "subject-neutral". By these 
expressions is meant that an observed action is represented in 
the perspective of an agent, rather than in the perspective of 
the particular person who observes the action (who may be 
the acting self, but also somebody else). Granted that a 
canonical context of action articulates a goal, means-ends 
relations and specific perceptual cues, it seems particularly 
important that the specific orientation of the observer's body 
does not present a systematic obstacle to understanding the 
actions of others. Brain imaging studies (Decety et al., 1997) 
support the view that, in both cases, the dynamic 
representation of a context - its simulation - are performed 
under the agent's point of view. Even when someone else's 
action is observed, the observer activates for himself the 
dynamical representation of the corresponding action in the 
neural structure that normally allows execution.  
This does not mean that the action is fully performed by 
the observer; nor that understanding another subject's action 
presupposes introspection of the same action performed by 
self; this only means that the "active" coding of an action is 
involved in performing as well as in observing it. A subject 
who has to identify whether a presented hand is a right or a 
left hand will move mentally her own hand - at a subpersonal 
level. A subject watching someone take an object with two 
fingers will activate a similar pattern in her premotor area. 
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Seeing an action seems to constitutively involve a disposition 
to act in a similar way.6 Although observing an action rarely 
evokes a conscious disposition to act, there are circumstances 
- e.g. observing a soccer game or watching a thriller movie-, 
in which the observer clearly feels immersed in the action he 
watches, and actively projects into it in a way that is 
consciously accessible. He catches himself running and 
jumping. 
 
B) Simulation as a psychological process 
From a psychological point of view, simulating consists 
in running "off line" stored information. Such an information 
may be perceptual and either refer to facts retrieved in an 
imagistic (analogic) mode, or to particular aspects of those 
facts (one can simulate having an experience of blue, of heat, 
of pain, of drinking coffee etc.). It may be pragmatic or 
praxic,7 with again the same contrast between whole contexts 
and individual properties: one can simulate oneself as doing 
this and that, or as moving in a particular way (in a more or 
less richly imagistic way). It can also be propositional, and 
simulation can be conducted on the basis of compositionality 
of senses -, as is the case in planning. The feature common to 
these simulatory episodes is that their contents are 
represented as outcomes of a subject's concrete abilities or 
doings rather than in an abstractly inferential way. In this 
respect, simulation has much to do with episodic memory 
(Tulving, 1983). For example, while simulating a future 
action (an activity that essentially involves concepts and 
                                                 
6 See Daprati et al. (1997), Jeannerod (1999), Proust (2000). 
7 Pragmatic information concerns the kind of action performed, whereas 
praxic information concerns the kind of movement performed when 
acting. 
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propositions), the planning agent considers the consequences 
of a selected context in a practical way (how the situation 
will then appear to her), rather than as detached predications 
(made so to speak "from nowhere").  
Simulating is thus a basic kind of dynamic memory 
process used in various areas of procedural knowledge, that 
cannot be divorced from the conceptual capacity used by a 
subject to categorise and infer external events and properties. 
The difference between semantic memory representation and 
simulation is simply that the former proceeds in a purely 
conceptual way, while the latter represents contexts in a 
mixed way. It uses both concepts to categorise a given 
context and qualitative, first-person experience to 
characterise the feelings and emotions relevant for the overall 
evaluation.  
 
A second important point is that in each of its specific 
domains of application, simulation can also be used in many 
different ways according to what we might at least prima 
facie characterise as the reasoning capacity available to the 
subject. Through simulation, as we already saw, various 
kinds of experienced canonical contexts with their associated 
inferences are extracted from memory and combined. In 
some systems it will be mainly used to revive past embodied 
situations; in others, it will be used in reasoning about future 
or counterfactual contexts.8 As several theory-of-mind-
theorists observed,9 simulating can be of any help to a 
mentaliser only if it allows deploying the various kinds of 
                                                 
8 The role of counterfactual reasoning in theory of mind acquisition is 
also stressed in Riggs et al. (1998) and in Donald Peterson's contribution 
in this volume. 
9 Leslie & German (1995), 129 ; Perner (1996 ). 
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inferences relevant in the simulated situation. The scope of 
reasoning in an individual thinker might here be constrained 
by the executive dispositions of the individual: those 
necessary for maintaining distinctive representations of one 
and the same context separate, and for exploiting the 
inferential relations across them.  
 
C) Practical reasoning, counterfactual reasoning and 
simulation 
There are two ways of simulating a counterfactual 
situation that need to be contrasted and explored further. 
Overlooking this difference may explain in part why Robert 
Gordon's radical simulationism fails to state the conditions 
that lead from simulation to mentalisation. To articulate this 
distinction, we need to explain what the frame of reference of 
a simulation is.10 A frame of reference consists in the 
modality in which an agent deploys her representation of a 
given context. A frame of reference can be the real world (in 
that case the subject represents past or present, actually 
experienced context tokens or types). It can be a potential 
world: a future context token is represented as relevantly 
analogous to a past one. It can also be a non-real state of 
affairs, i.e. counterfactual or strongly counterfactual: in the 
latter case only, the subject represents explicitly the situation 
as part of a possible world distinct from the real world.  
The capacity of mastering the various modal dimensions 
of thinking in distinctive frames of reference has interesting 
links with the capacity to reason conceptually. The generality 
principle, in virtue of which mastering a concept implies the 
ability to entertain "indefinitely many thoughts" in which this 
                                                 
10 For a more detailed presentation, see Proust (2001). 
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concept appears (Evans, 1982, 105) would seem to require 
from any concept user that he should already be capable of 
counterfactual reasoning. This type of reasoning seems to be 
indeed a major way of exploring in thought the various 
combinations allowed by conceptual components. This 
requirement would have the unfortunate consequence to 
restrict concept use to those thinkers that are able to represent 
possible states of affairs in exotic worlds. For example, is it 
needed, to master the concept of a "unicorn", to understand 
sentences such as "had they been real, unicorns would have 
superseded horses in number"? A weaker interpretation 
seems compatible with the generality principle, a principle 
which, according to Evans himself, is "an ideal to which our 
actual system of thoughts only approximately conforms" 
(ibid. 105). In this weaker sense, mastering a concept would 
imply an ability to entertain thoughts involving that concept 
inside at least one frame of reference. Accepting this view on 
concept mastery would lead to various extensions of 
"generality" according to the set of objects and contexts 
included in the world (or sets of worlds) represented in 
thought. This kind of distinction would account for the fact 
that a child may reason about unicorns inside the story which 
presents them as having some properties, while being unable 
to consider them "outside the story", as fictional entities with 
no direct causal impact on the real world. 
What is true of concept use also applies to episodes of 
simulation. Not only because an episode of simulation often 
involves concepts, as we saw above. But also because 
simulation, being a species of representational thought, also 
possesses a frame of reference for its own sake, 
independently of the concepts it contains. It may be the case 
that imaging a shade of blue, for example, presupposes 
having actually seen the same shade (just as applying a 
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concept to a new object presupposes having the concept). But 
nothing seems to restrict imaging to retrieving prior percepts. 
Imaging may also combine imagistic contents in new ways 
(as presumably, does a composer or a painter when creating a 
new piece). An artist, who can exploit these differences and 
their implications as part of what his/her piece suggests to an 
observer or a listener, can also, in such a case, consider 
several frames of reference in parallel. It may be supposed 
that the informed observer/listener will be able in turn to 
trace these various hints to contrastive approaches when 
exposed to the work. 
Robert Gordon was right to stress that simulating was a 
basic way of performing practical reasoning.11 But he 
apparently failed to observe that the crucial step for 
simulating mentally consists in the joint ability to represent 
arbitrary states of affairs and to reason across frames of 
reference. Simulating familiar, absent contexts is the main 
focus of pretend games. Children, around 2 years of age, 
exercise their practical reasoning ability in putting together 
counterfactuals and deriving relevant consequences in a 
world close to the real one (Leslie, 1987). It should be noted, 
however, that the frame of reference of story telling or of 
pretend games is restricted to the isolated situation 
considered. There is only one world being referred to when a 
boy pretends being an Indian warrior, and the reasoning 
involves considering exclusively the properties that hold 
inside that world. Thus a playing child's way of simulating 
uses the same kind of capacity as when remembering familiar 
contexts (both kinds of memory involve representing only 
one context in a world). The only, but important difference is 
that the child engaged in pretend-play calls this 
                                                 
11See also Heal (1996), 78. 
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representation actively, rather than in a passive associative 
mode. In pretend-play, some properties of the props are 
actively disengaged while others are retained (a banana does 
not hold as a fruit, but as an object shaped as a telephone). 
Fiction also has the property of helping the child to project 
himself in a situation including a number of arbitrary 
properties which will be used as a basis for inferences - those 
being constitutive of the understanding of the story. There is 
no transparency of psychological attitudes at this stage in 
phylogeny or in human development: mammals, primates and 
young children exercise pretence without being able to fully 
understand what pretending involves. They know how to 
pretend without necessarily knowing that pretending 
conceptually imply believing.12 
Exercising this imaginative ability in story 
understanding or in pretending however does not amount yet 
to a full understanding of pretending as a mental state. For 
such an understanding would require, in the view I defend, 
the further ability to move within and without the simulated 
situation. 
 
In a primary stage of simulation, as found in pretend-
play, no explicit representation of the world as it truly is, nor 
of the contrastive claims of truth made in the real world and 
in the pretended world, need be involved. This interpretation 
of pretend-play differs from a view in which make-belief 
presupposes that, in every episode of pretending, there is a set 
of beliefs incompatible with the pretended situation, which 
the pretender must explicitly rule out while she pretends. 
Evans (1982) for example analyses make-believe as 
involving both engaging in pretence and suppressing 
                                                 
12 For a similar view, see Heal (1995), 40. 
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disbelief. In that analysis, simulating that * F has G* (when 
as a matter of fact, F does not have G) implies that one 
believes that "F does not have G" and that one silences that 
belief. As a consequence of this view, thinking 
counterfactually in pretence involves representing two 
worlds: the world of the game, and the world as it 
independently is. It also requires having a set of rules (a rule 
of incorporation and a recursive rule) establishing which 
truths from the real world still hold within the pretence.  
In the present analysis, simulating that *F has G* does 
not initially presuppose that "F does not have G" and that the 
subject knows it. Weak counterfactual thought, therefore, 
consists in simulating a situation in which F does not have G, 
without representing explicitly whether doing so violates the 
rule for correctly representing F. In such a case, a canonical 
context for acting is presented as satisfied, using partial cues 
and ignoring those cues that do not match. The key element 
in pretending seems to consist in highlighting the relevance 
of actions, gestures and social meaning as determining a 
shared canonical context, to the detriment of various 
perceptual contents. The canonical gestures and their targets 
determine saliences in the perceptual scene. Pretending that 
one is in a car might be obtained by imaging a car and 
producing some auditory signal for the car's engine. A child 
pretending to drive a car does not need to actively combat the 
belief that he is not actually sitting in a car. The pretence 
develops from the simple fact of imaging the dynamical 
properties associated to driving.  
This analysis is consonant with developmental evidence. 
In pretend play, as well as in understanding narratives, 
children have initial difficulty at maintaining the scripts 
separate: they tend to take the products of their imagination 
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as real, in particular when they are afraid by them.13 They 
may also infer that some properties in the world have been 
changed as a result of the events in the fiction. Children 
finally learn that the world of the game and the world in 
which the game occurs are different, and license separate 
kinds of deductions. It is of course not clear how they learn 
this (to know how to respond to this would amount to having 
accounted for theory of mind acquisition). It may be through 
continuous practice, with the help of a more and more 
effective working memory. Alternatively, it may be through 
the help of a specific innate module coming to fruition 
around 3. 
What is suggested is that there is more in strong 
counterfactual make-believing than "simple" pretence, and 
that the difference can be understood in terms of the frames 
of reference involved. This ability has been described, in 
Recanati's apparatus, by the distinction between exercising a 
simulation and exploiting it. Although we need not accept the 
theory of projection/retrojection defended by Recanati, the 
contrast drawn by Recanati is indeed close to the present 
view on strong counterfactual reasoning.14 
                                                 
13 Harris et al., (1991). 
14 According to Recanati, exercising a simulation consists in accepting a 
set of premises as holding in a particular imagined situation, and drawing 
from them some relevant consequences inside the same imagined 
situation. Accepting the premises does not mean that the simulator must 
take them as true. He only pretends them to be true, or imagines, or 
supposes them to be true. Deriving further properties from the supposed 
ones does no more belong to pure imagination. Such a conditional 
reasoning may be taken as involving typical relations within the real 
world or a subset of them. 
 Exploiting a simulation allows considering the same situation both from 
the alien point of view in which we project ourselves (through exercising 
simulation) and from our own point of view. Exploiting simulation allows 
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If we now examine the structure of the specific type of 
simulation involved in psychological attribution, it appears 
that the concept of a frame of reference is essential in 
understanding exactly what it is to embed an ascent routine in 
another. What Gordon suggested is that, by successively 
engaging in a number of projections, one becomes able to 
grasp the notion of a mental location. The problem we 
identified above is that nothing constrains the simulator to 
entertain the notion of a causal role for belief. She might as 
well reason, as chimps probably do in their own modes, that 
agents have varying dispositions correlated with the 
behavioural and other physical cues available in the 
environment. 
This is no longer possible in the case of the kind of 
embedded counterfactual reasoning that we are presently 
describing. In the exercising mode, the simulator must first 
project into a situation in order to draw various "internal" 
inferences from the properties that it contains. In the 
exploiting mode, the simulator must examine the external 
consequences of the projected situation for the real world (or 
for some other counterfactual world). For example, in a task 
                                                                                                    
the simulator to consider the situation simulated not only as a set of 
meaningful relations between properties, but also as having certain 
relations with the actual world. For example, understanding Mallarmé's 
poems, requires both exercising and exploiting simulation, i.e. requires a 
parallel consideration of the situation depicted, and what belongs to the 
writing conventions. This is not a situation peculiar to literature. 
Understanding mentally another person requires both seeing things as she 
does and retrodicting the causes or predicting the real effects of the 
simulated situation in connection to the world as we see it. While 
exercising a simulation involves a projection within a situation, exploiting 
a simulation involves an embedding of the former situation within a real 
world perspective, a process which Recanati calls reflection (1999, 101). 
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of unexpected transfer, the child must first represent the 
counterfactual situation CS according to which the object did 
not change its location (from O to O'). She must then draw 
the consequences of this situation for an action relevant in CS 
(fetch the object in O), and finally infer from this the 
consequences for the real world: the simulated agent will go 
to O, even though the object is now in O'. 
What may be an obstacle to understanding the role of 
exploitation in false belief tasks is that spatial properties are 
easily traceable from one world to the next: in the allocentric 
mode, locations can be determined absolutely. The 
unexpected transfer task relies on the ability to determine 
absolute locations, and memorise which locations have been 
salient in a past, now counterfactual situation. In such a task, 
the extra step from examining a counterfactual world to 
drawing consequences in the real world may well appear to 
be a useless sophistication. 
 Cognitive lying offers a finer-grained way of exploring 
how a subject exploits a simulation. The interest of this kind 
of ability is that it cannot rely on spatial memory alone. Let 
us suppose that Jean murdered his wife in their Parisian flat, 
but claims that he was away from Paris at the time of the 
murder. In order to make his lie accepted as a truth, the 
simulator must engage himself (through a narration or some 
kind of staging) into a counterfactual situation such that the 
desired properties follow: he was away watching an exhibit 
in London. But he also must compare the world of his 
pretence with the real world, in order to revise, among the 
many properties derivable in both worlds that are 
incompatible, those that can be found not to hold in the real 
world. Inter alia, all the signs of his presence in Paris must be 
erased, the Channel ferry or other public transportation 
systems must have been working, the exhibit must be on in 
 25
London that day, etc. To be successful, the liar must both 
exercise simulation of the fictional world he projects into, 
and exploit the real consequences of his fictional world, 
through maintaining a maximal coherence across both 
worlds. He will have to use the kinds of rules which Evans 
spelled out for make-believing: new facts can be incorporated 
in the lie as long as they do not contradict any statement 
(falsely) presented as true. 
Exploiting a simulation thus first requires establishing in 
thought two types of representations: one of some pretended 
situation and the other of a model of the real world as it 
appears to the simulator. Then the simulator has to reason 
across these models. He has to evaluate the non-actual 
situation on the background of the real world, to derive which 
facts are or can be made compatible and which facts are 
incompatible (ignoring the property that forms the core of the 
lie). This step may be seen as a truly embedded simulation, or 
as two embedded uses of the same simulation. The question 
can now be raised again of how this more complex kind of 
simulation allows an agent to acquire psychological concepts. 
 
 
Complex simulation and psychological concept acquisition 
 
In the present approach, a practical understanding of the 
concept of belief is supposed to be constituted by the capacity 
of evaluating the content of one simulation through the 
content of another. A subject who exploits simulation in the 
sense indicated has to draw inferences at least at two levels, 
allowing her to determine what is wrong in the simulation1 
compared to a simulation2. Is the concept of belief, with its 
inferential structure and its associated truth-value, practically 
grasped as an outcome of the kind of embedded 
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counterfactual reasoning described above? The practical 
know-how involved consists in exploiting the simulated 
perspective for one's own sake; i.e. deriving consequences 
inside a simulation that, properly redescribed, are relevant in 
the real world. This view is in agreement with a prediction of 
evolutionary psychology that psychological concept 
acquisition is part of the arms race driving selection of new 
capacities in phylogeny. Using what one understands as 
being conspecifics'views on things is of primary significance 
in order (i) to take advantage of what a foe knows or fails to 
know by manipulating him into improper actions; or (ii) to 
help a friend or a relative to acquire knowledge or revise his 
beliefs in order to act rationally. 
There are two obvious questions to raise at this point. 
One is: why should the choice of the relevant assumptions in 
simulating some foreign perspective be any less circular in 
the present suggestion than in Gordon's one? The second is: 
how is a simulator able to grasp from his embedded 
simulation a notion not only of belief, but also of all the 
various psychological attitudes that can be entertained? 
 
1) Simulation theory and vicious circularity 
 I will suggest that what appears as a vicious circularity 
might result from a perspective mistake. What could be 
termed "simple" simulation occurs only early in development 
(or in other primate species). Simple simulation is simulation 
conceived as a process reflecting only knowledge of physical 
facts and, for humans, linguistic expressions for occurrent 
belief states that are not fully understood as mental states. In 
other words, simple simulation is the kind of simulation of 
others that is exercised in the absence of psychological 
concepts. 
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 Now it is clear that, at some point in development, 
psychological concepts and theories do help a simulator to 
adjust her simulations to the specific cases in which the 
projected situation departs on certain assumptions from the 
corresponding closest real world situation. On the other hand, 
it was claimed above that the really important step in 
simulation occurs when the situation to be simulated is not of 
a familiar kind, i.e. does not coincide with the memory of a 
past event experienced by the simulator. The difficult 
question is therefore the following: Can this kind of 
simulation - using both a counterfactual situation and another 
world of reference to which the former is compared - get off 
the ground without using psychological concepts? 
Fortunately, there is a class of cases showing that it 
indeed is the case. The reason is obvious: the kind of 
simulation based on counterfactual reasoning that is 
necessary for mentalising is also needed in cases having 
nothing to do with psychological attribution. While planning 
a complex action, for example, one must be able to introduce 
new objects with a set of consequences (exercising 
simulation), and predict what the consequences on the 
planned course of action will be in a specific real-world 
context. For example, when planning to clean a well, one 
must consider the possibility that some toxic gas be present at 
the bottom and kill the cleaning human agent. This type of 
simulation involves various inferences external to the 
situation considered, through a process of exploitation of the 
simulation. It also needs a revision of the default assumptions 
that hold when cleaning an ordinary object. Such a revision 
of the situation does not need to appeal to any psychological 
knowledge. 
If pure counterfactual simulation is available at the level 
of the physical world and exercised routinely in planning 
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action, it may safely be concluded that this type of reasoning 
does not involve as a precondition a mastery of psychological 
concepts. In the case in which simulation is used to 
understand others and predict their behaviour through 
psychological attribution, one could suggest that the type of 
counterfactual reasoning involved is of the same kind, except 
that situations are indexed to definite individuals "whose 
situation it is". One could object here that "a fact to x" 
already involves an understanding of a mental access to x. 
But remember that a radical simulationist will export, so to 
speak, his own immediate epistemic relations to facts, 
appropriately restricted to specific contexts. The objection 
can therefore be countered by the routine ascent: I deal with 
P1, Peter deals with P2, and we form representations 
corresponding to P1 and P2. The notion of "dealing" as used 
by the simulator in fact draws on his own belief/desire 
structure, not necessarily on his belief /desire concepts. For 
the rival representations in question dot not need to be 
represented as representations, contrary to what theory-
theorists would claim.15 They only need to be accessed 
demonstratively, as "this situation" versus "that situation". 
Saying this does not commit the simulation theorist to 
the bold view that all there is to be known about belief can be 
gathered through this practical ability of embedded 
reasoning. The idea is that the practical reasoning ability is 
the foundation for understanding others, not that acquiring 
this ability through reasoning on various counterfactual 
contexts is sufficient to reliably predict others in all cases. 
Knowing the kinds of facts that are typically encountered by 
others is often not enough to simulate them; you also need to 
know what they specifically believe, desire, or fear to 
                                                 
15 In particular, Perner (1991). 
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represent the situation as they see it and to predict accurately 
what they will do. It is thus plausible that the set of 
assumptions to be used in deriving the facts that hold as a 
consequence of some situations cannot in many cases be 
correctly established when the simulator does not fully 
master the concept of belief. Simulation theorists do not need 
however to deny this obvious fact. What they might suggest 
is that a child starts applying strong counterfactual simulation 
in a less-than-reliable way. An imperfect capacity for 
simulating others may be enough to get the practical know-
how required for belief understanding started. In a situation 
such as the false belief task, for example, a simulating child 
only has to represent dynamically the goal and dispositions 
for action attached to the context as known, and those 
attached to the context before the transfer occurred. 
 
 But the preceding parallel of simulating others with 
counterfactual planning may give rise to a more serious 
objection. The latter focusses on the claim that reasoning 
across frames of reference, - exploiting the consequences of 
one frame in another -, should provide the simulator with the 
practical knowledge of what it means to have a false belief. 
The objection16 goes as follows. Let us imagine that A is able 
to reason across frames, and that he compares how things 
look to B with how things are. In such a scheme A can 
attribute a false belief to B, but this is a far cry from 
attributing false beliefs to himself. Considered as concepts, 
truth and falsity apply however in a general way ; such a 
generality might well fail to hold in the case of the kind 
simulation presently explored; even though simulating 
counterfactual situations involves a capacity to evaluate a 
                                                 
16 I thank Jerôme Dokic for articulating this objection. 
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possible world as  not realised, there is no guarantee that a 
simulator will thereby be able to evaluate his/her own 
simulations and predictions as subject to error. Recognizing 
that one’s own beliefs can be false, the objector concludes, 
involves more than reasoning across frames of reference; it 
involves understanding that beliefs are propositional 
attitudes, i.e that their contents can constitutively be true or 
false. Therefore our view on simulation plus counterfactual 
reasoning is not better off than Gordon's radical 
simulationism. Both views are indeed circular. 
Before attemping to answer this powerful objection, let 
us first remind what is at stake. The present paper, again, 
does not aim at defending the view that simulation might 
provide in and by itself all the necessary means for 
understanding other minds in all circumstances. What it does 
claim, however, is that a practical way of grasping and 
possibly putting to use another subject's representation of the 
world consists in exploiting counterfactual reasoning; i.e. 
drawing the consequences of a situation as simulated in the 
simulator's own world. As we will see below, this ability 
could be the underpinning of mental concept acquisition. 
Clearly, if it is shown that counterfactual reasoning of this 
kind can only be performed by a subject who is already  
mastering the concept of truth, then our claim will fall prey to 
circularity. Several authors  indeed seem to accept the view 
that a subject only grasps the concept of truth when she 
possesses a theory of mind (Carruthers,  1996, Papineau, 
2000) . 
Now one way of defeating the objection is to show that there 
is a conceptual difference between  evaluating practically 
one's own embedded simulation and explicitly applying to it 
a metarepresentational concept of truth. Accepting this 
conceptual difference does not lead us to expect however that 
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is should be observable in empirically distinct predictive 
behaviors or rational strategies. Even though only a full-
blown theory of mind can provide a subject with the fully 
general and explicit concept of truth, a simulator endowed 
with the kind of counterfactual  reasoning described would 
indeed reach a coextensive practical knowledge. For truth is 
something that a simulator desires even though he does not 
master the concept of truth. A simulator wants her simulation 
to deliver predictions from which she can actually take 
advantage. As Papineau puts it, "If you act on true beliefs, 
you will generally get the results you want, but not if you act 
on false beliefs" (Papineau, 2000, 201). In the case of 
simulation, this implicit, or practical desire for truth, needs to 
apply to one's own simulation. If you try and figure out what 
another subject is up to, you must be prepared to revise your 
simulation.  A search for alternative explanations involves an 
implicit recognition that a given episode of simulation got 
things wrong. The distinction that the individual simulator 
needs to master at this point is of a successful/unsuccesful 
prediction17.  
This argument from the very structure of revision in 
simulation can be completed by phylogenetic considerations 
on the origin of mentalizing  capacities. It is generally 
accepted that the selective pressure on more and more 
sophisticated mentalizers is based on the need to detect 
cheaters, liars, misinformed and malevolent communicators. 
Thus a  reflexive dimension should be immediately salient in 
                                                 
17 It will be noted that the appearance/reality distinction, as studied by 
Flavell et al. and many other developmental psychologists, does not 
coincide with the distinction between two stages in acquiring the concept 
of truth. Our notion of counterfactual simulation allows a simulator to 
grasp practically this contrast as one of differing simulated points of view. 
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counterfactual reasoning applied to others : knowing that one 
can be simulated and taken advantage of, by being offered a 
distorted view of reality is a crucial step in such reasoning. In 
order to understand that someone tries to lie to you, you must 
simulate yourself listening to a false indication, and acting on 
its basis in a way serving the other’s ends. Thus a successful 
simulator is one that anticipates that he could be manipulated 
into misrepresenting things ; but again, this anticipation does 
not have to be explicitly understood in terms of truth or 
falsity, nor even in terms of representation; it is enough if the 
subject is able to imagine (or recall) the  situation A where P 
holds, and contrast with situation B where P does not hold, 
with their contrasted affordances for the self or for others. 
Let us summarize this point. Exercising simulation does not 
require a concept of simulation or representation, any more 
than believing requires having a concept of belief.  Having 
the sense of a successful or unsuccessful simulation is the key 
to revising, but no concept of truth or of a true belief needs to 
be mastered. Finally the simulation of being possibly 
deceived is the essential reason why counterfactual 
simulation is being developed; this gives us a presumption, if 
not an argument yet, that a simulator is able to look at her 
own simulations as fallible. 
 
The general solution of the problem of psychological 
concept application is that reasoning mentally involves a 
capacity to use perspectival information in strongly 
counterfactual cases. The latter ability is linked to executive 
properties of working memory, (maintaining active two rival 
representations for the same context) and not to 
psychological concept possession per se. Simulationists do 
not need to deny that this kind of reasoning should be 
considerably enhanced through linguistic expression. Symbol 
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use will obviously help a child to build the relevant 
metarepresentations, to reason from them and to 
communicate rationally about them. This observation leads 
us to our second question. 
 
 2) Is a simulator able to acquire the various psychological 
concepts through simulation?  
We saw earlier that Robert Gordon admits that 
simulation does not deliver a genuine, comprehending 
ascription of mental states, while nevertheless claiming that 
simulation may end up with "greater conceptual 
understanding". (1996, 17) We tried above to clarify in which 
way secondary simulation involves a specific kind of 
counterfactual reasoning. The question that needs to be raised 
at this point is to understand whether this know-how develops 
into a know-that; is a simulator able to grasp the general 
structure of reasoning involved in mentalising, and to identify 
conceptually the various roles which propositional attitudes 
play in a subject's reasoning? How does a simulator manage 
to distinguish the various psychological concepts (believing, 
desiring, intending) that may be predicated of the various 
simulated contents? 
As Heal remarks, Robert Gordon's view that simulating 
just implies putting oneself in a state similar to the target fails 
to provide the kind of psychological knowledge that a theory 
of mind of any variety should provide:  
 
"If getting into states similar to those of others is to be of any use in 
psychological understanding, it must not merely occur; it must also 
be recognised for what it is" (Heal, 1995, 44).  
 
How then might we construct a simulator's 
understanding, say, that John believes that P, without positing 
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circularly that the content of the simulator's pretence was 
[believing that P]?  
A plausible suggestion for bridging the gap between the 
simulatory episode and psychological concept use might 
consist in invoking a procedure accepted in other fields of 
concept acquisition, i.e. demonstrative ostension. Heal 
presents this strategy as a general solution for identifying 
both the content of a simulation episode and the kind of 
simulation instantiated in this episode. What subject A 
simulates is that subject B entertains this content. A also 
actually simulates that P in this way (believing) rather than in 
that way (desiring or fearing that P). This solution however 
presents some problems of its own, (on which we will not 
expand here) having to do with the fact that simulating as an 
experience (referred to demonstratively) is not itself a belief 
experience (but rather a pretend-belief experience). Therefore 
pointing to a simulating episode will not allow pinning down 
a belief episode, but at best a pretend-belief one. At best, 
however: for when engaging under the pretend mode in a 
given situation, a simulator will normally have a variety of 
attitudes, from pretend-belief to pretend-desire and pretend-
fear, not to mention various pretend-emotions. An additional 
difficulty is that the notion of a belief (or pretend-belief) 
experience is not clearly independent from the corresponding 
conceptual thought that one has a belief, or a pretend-belief. 
Thus the disintrication of contents and propositional attitudes 
linked to a given situation seems to be made no easier 
through the demonstrative procedure alone.  
A more promising way of disintricating attitudes may 
consist in relying both on simulation as a reasoning 
procedure and on social learning. We saw earlier that the 
ascent routine, as usually understood, is only a way to parrot, 
rather than to express a judgement self-ascribing a belief. 
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What makes it so is that the use of believing that is relevant 
in the routine ascent expresses only a product of a primary 
simulation (or simple simulation) of a specific context. A 
"secondary" simulator however (able to perform strong 
simulation) transforms her prior understanding of the word "I 
believe", when developing her reasoning abilities. The 
question becomes one of articulating the know-how involved 
in reasoning counterfactually and the conceptual knowledge 
about belief and other psychological concepts. 
A distinction made by Andrew Woodfield (Woodfield, 
1996, 1997) will help understand how such an articulation 
may be effected in the course of development. We will first 
present his view, presented as the author did in a way 
consonant with theory-theory, and will adjust it later in terms 
consonant with simulation theory. The psychological 
concepts that are constitutive of a theory of mind, such as 
believing, desiring, and intending, should be seen as 
accessible public concepts, i.e. essentially communal norms. 
According to Woodfield, concepts in general are of this kind. 
They regulate human reasoning and communication in a way 
that does not presuppose their being explicitly grasped under 
a theoretical formulation:  
 
"The player subscribes to the norms in advance of fully knowing 
what they are and without knowing in detail how to apply them, just 
as a club-member subscribes to the rules of the club without having 
properly read the rule-book" (Woodfield, 1996, 91).  
 
On the other hand, in his view, an individual thinker has 
a particular set of inter-related beliefs and know-how, 
however vague and inchoate, about any specific domain 
(folk-psychology as well as folk-physics, folk-biology, etc.). 
Her beliefs about belief, desire, and related concepts are a 
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result of her particular experience, and thus differ from any 
other thinker's in some ways. These beliefs are theoretical in 
the sense that they go beyond observation. These individual 
theories, which Woodfield calls "conceptions", are 
"evanescent" personal constructions, in the sense that they 
are permanently revised and thus highly unstable, particularly 
so in the course of development between 2 and 6. A child 
may thus both have a common concept of belief in the sense 
that she understands sentences of a public language 
containing words expressing it, while possessing a different, 
idiosyncratic personal conception of belief (in which, for 
example, whatever true beliefs the self has are equally 
accessible to other selves). The important two points are first 
that, even in such a case, the child can be credited with 
having the common concept of belief, rather than with using 
some private or distorted concept; and second, that her 
conception of belief may become more appropriate, i.e. more 
reliable, when her individual conception gradually adjusts to 
the common norm. 
Woodfield's approach can be accommodated within a 
simulationist framework. The core idea is that psychological 
concepts form a framework of socially accepted concepts and 
norms, to which every language user refers when 
communicating about psychological facts and events. In the 
course of development, a child needs two different types of 
information to apply these concepts in a reliable way to new 
sets of facts and events.  
She must first have access to the relevant kind of 
linguistic exchange: "the ascent routine" is one of many 
standard ways of mastering a mentalistic language. Others of 
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the same ilk are offered by parental guidance18 in helping 
their children recognising emotions and various mental 
attitudes. The social character of these exposures to 
conceptual terms provides the content of concepts, although 
these concepts may only at first be used in very restricted 
kinds of inferences. In the present view, linguistic exchange 
provides a "proto-theory" for folk-psychology rather than a 
full-blown inferential structure. In the case of the mental, a 
crucial factor for building a psychological theory consists in 
what we called strongly counterfactual simulation.  
The second kind of knowledge a mentalising child needs 
is thus the set of reasoning, representational and executive 
capacities that allow a thinker to use the social concepts in a 
fully general way. This kind of knowledge is simulatory and 
procedural. A child must know how to represent a type of 
situation across worlds and use this representation to make 
accurate predictions on how these worlds interconnect. 
Thanks to the second kind of learning, a child becomes able 
to become a creative mentaliser: she now has her own 
inferential capacities allowing her concept of belief to operate 
in new situations.19  
                                                 
18 Cf. the role of mimicry in typing mental states is hypothesised in 
Gergely & Watson, (1998). See also Proust (2001). 
19 Although we cannot develop this point here, reliability of simulation 
procedures for understanding others' mental states may be articulated in 
terms of the specific conditions for simulating: that the processes of 
thinking across subjects (simulator and simulatee) are the same or 
sufficiently similar ; that the context simulated is the same or sufficiently 
similar; that the knowledge of the context is the same or sufficiently 
similar; and finally, that the simulator has the reasoning and executive 
memory capacities allowing him to reason across worlds in the way 
described above. (See Heal, 1995, 40). 
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As suggested above, both kinds of knowledge might 
actually be interdependent, in the sense of contributing to 
each other's development. Sentences retrieved from memory 
help simulate types of situations, and contribute to develop 
efficient execution. On the other hand, reasoning helps a 
child distinguish in which relevant aspects two linguistic 
descriptions of a situation type differ. Saying this does not 
amount to acknowledging that simulation does not have a 





Let us summarise the solution offered above to the 
problem of psychological concept acquisition. This solution 
seems in its core to be in the spirit of Gordon's radical 
simulationism. The basic ingredients include again 
simulatory practice and ascent routine. Our expanded theory, 
however, contrasts two kinds of simulations, and emphasizes 
the structuring role of counterfactual reasoning in embedding 
simulations and deriving facts stable across them. 
Furthermore, it completes ascent routines with social learning 
of folk-theoretical words.  
When exposed to a public language, a child is provided 
with sentences relating desire, belief, and intention 
expressions. The various terms involved in a theory of mind 
are first grasped in a shallow and idiosyncratic way as a 
result of the child's developping mastery of public language. 
As we saw, such a linguistic mastery of social concept-terms 
does not amount yet to possessing a theory. 
Independently from her linguistic ability in using ascent 
routines and echoing adult's talk about belief and desire, a 
child relies on her developing reasoning and executive 
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memory capacities to anticipate others' doings, emotions and 
intentions. Strong counterfactual simulation seems to be the 
key ability for such an ability to anticipate. She may on this 
basis develop a personal conception of lying, being 
misinformed, and having weird desires. This personal 
conception will gradually be merged into the common, 
socially transmitted, folk-psychological theory. 
 The threat of vicious circularity seems thus to dissolve. 
For a subject does not need to know herself to know others. 
She rather needs to evaluate situations in a way both 
psychologically and rationally similar to other subjects. In the 
proposed view, as in Gordon's approach, psychological 
knowledge has nothing to do with an introspective self. The 
present view stresses further its social nature. Mastering a 
theory of mind cannot be reached independently of social 
interaction. But an individual can only benefit from social 
theory-learning if she is able in practice to represent 
counterfactual situations dynamically, and to extract from 
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